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1 
I. INTRODUCTION  
There is a sucker born every day.1 
P.T. Barnum 
A. THESIS OVERVIEW –PROBLEM DEFINITION 
This thesis explores the elements of military deception and defines the 
overarching principles that make for successful military deception.  A good reference 
point is the six principles of military deception as defined by Joint Publication (JP) 3-58: 
focus, integration, timeliness, security, objective, and centralized control.2 However, I 
propose that operational advantage, consisting of surprise, information advantage and 
security are essential elements of a successful military deception.  For the purposes of 
this thesis, operational advantage is defined as a military lead over the enemy (higher 
ground, greater freedom of movement, more troops, better equipment), information 
advantage is enhanced situational awareness (better intelligence, understanding of the 
battlefield/opposing force), and efficiency is defined as a faster and more succinct 
decision making time line.   To refine the scope of the research, this analysis of deception 
is focused on the tactical and operational levels of war.   Figure 1 is a conceptual diagram 
of JP 3-58’s six overlapping principles of military deception. 
                                                 
1 {World of Quotes.com}, Retrieved on 29 May 2006, http://www.worldofquotes.com/author. 
2 Joint Publication 3-58: Joint Doctrine for Military Deception. (Washington DC: Government Printing 
Office), I2 – I3. 
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Figure 1.   Six Principles of Military Deception 
 
The commander’s objective, i.e., what the commander intends to accomplish, is the 
centralizing idea of any military deception and are hence represented centrally in the 
figure. 
B. WHAT IS DECEPTION? 
There are many different definitions of deception, with supporting principles that 
will be further explored in Chapter II, The Principles of Deception.  In plain terms, 
deception consists of actions taken to manipulate the adversary’s information network in 
order to induce the adversary to react in a specific manner.  These actions can include 
manipulation of the adversary’s intelligence apparatus.  Deception is executed so that the 
commander’s mission is accomplished or goal is achieved.   
The basic U.S. Military definition of deception, as stated in Joint Publication 3-
58, Joint Doctrine for Military Deception, is “…those actions executed to deliberately 
mislead adversary military decision makers as to friendly military capabilities, intentions, 
and operations…”3 Per the JP 3-58 definition, deception can be applied to all levels of 
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3 
war and is a subset of Command and Control Warfare (C2W).  However, deception is 
more commonly described as a subcomponent of Information Operations (IO).4   
JP 3-13, Joint Doctrine for Information Operations, further characterizes 
deception as an offensive information operations capability—i.e., “…the integrated use 
of assigned and supporting capabilities and activities, mutually supported by intelligence, 
to affect adversary decision makers and achieve or promote specific objectives”.5   JP 3-
13, IO, was updated in February 2006 to reflect changes and updates in information 
operations.  The revised joint publication, explicitly articulates the role of deception in 
military planning with a detailed appendix/checklist.  Given the greater level of detail, 
this update implies that information operations are being considered a more important 
part of military planning, and by extension; deception should be receiving greater 
emphasis.  So, now that the U.S. military intends to do more about information 
operations, how does deception better fit into the overall framework of military strategy? 
C. DECEPTION IN MILITARY STRATEGY 
Deception has been an important component of war through the ages.  In recent 
times, however, deception has often been undervalued, as evidenced by the removal of 
Field Manual (FM) 90-2, Military Deception, from the listing of official U.S. Army 
publications and the publication date (and last review) of the Joint Publication (JP) 3-58, 
Joint Doctrine on Military Deception, of May 1996.   Confusing and fooling the enemy 
has allowed many an under-manned and out-gunned commander to win a decisive victory 
or an asymmetric force to win at lower cost and risk.   Indeed, Barton Whaley contends 
that nearly all deceptions have been successful and there have been no failures.6   Dr. 
Whaley’s comment is based on his analysis of 167 battles, in which deception played a 
major role between 1914 and 1973.7   The Chinese strategist, Sun Tzu, similarly stated, 
“All warfare is based on deception.”8 
                                                 
4 Joint Publication 3-58: Joint Doctrine for Military Deception. (Washington DC: Government Printing 
Office), vi. 
5 Joint Publication 3-13: Joint Doctrine for Information Operations (Washington DC: Government 
Printing Office), viii. 
6 Barton Whaley, quote from Dr. Hy Rothstein.   
7 Jon Van Fleet. Tactical Military Deception. (NPS’ Master’s Thesis, 1985), 25. 
8 Samuel Griffith (translator). Sun Tzu: The Art of War (London: Oxford University Press, 1963), 66. 
4 
JP 3-13 outlines the methodology for executing military deception, highlights the 
salient considerations when undertaking deception, and lays the foundation for the 
relevance of deception to military planning and strategy.   The following paragraph 
clearly shows deception as an integral part of planning a military operation: 
The target is the adversary decision maker, who is studied through 
Intelligence collection, analysis, and dissemination systems (his 
communication channels). In essence, know thy enemy and his decision 
making process.  The goal is to have the adversary respond in a desired 
manner; hence the deception is focused on a particular objective.  
Deception is always woven into the basic operational plan to allow 
overlap and to effect timeliness.  Finally, intelligence is essential to a 
successful deception operation.  Intel needs to identify the targets, assists 
in creating a story credible, and assessing the effectiveness of the 
operational.  None of which can be accomplished without proper 
Operations Security (OPSEC), the need to know and keeping the plan out 
of the enemy control. 9 
Why, then, had deception seemingly fallen to the wayside in military planning?  
The answer is unclear, but D. Glantz, author of Soviet Military Deception in the Second 
World War suggests, “In the West…deception is seen as immoral, and more than one 
authority has claimed that, as a result, Americans resort to deception only reluctantly or 
else do it poorly”. 10  Maybe the U.S. public is averse to lying, cheating, and deceiving to 
win a war.  Or perhaps it could be the misperception that strong nations don’t need to use 
deception to win and only weak nations use deception for lack of military might and 
sound strategy.  
In military strategy, deception has been both praised and disparaged by the 
leading theorists.  Carl von Clausewitz advised against the use of deception: 
The bitter earnestness of necessity usually forces us into direct action, so 
that there is no room for that game.  In a word, the pieces on the strategical 
chessboard are lacking in that agility which is the element of stratagem 
and cunning. 11  
                                                 
9 Joint Publication 3-13: Joint Doctrine for Information Operations (Washington DC: Government 
Printing Office), II-4 – II-5. 
10 D. Glantz. Soviet Military Deception in the Second World War (London: Frank Cass, 1989) quoted 
in Jon Latimer. Deception in War (The Overlook Press: Woodstock, NY, 2001), 3. 
11 C. Carr (ed), The Book of War (NY: Random House, 2000), 425. 
5 
On the pro-deception position, Niccolo Machiavelli, author of The Prince, an 
exemplary treatise on statesmanship and power, states the ruler (or military leader) 
should acquire and maintain a good reputation while accomplishing the necessary evils to 
accomplish the goals--in other words, be deceptive to reach a desired end state. 12  Sir 
Basil Henry Liddell Hart, the esteemed British military strategist, suggested: 
Luck can never be divorced from war, as war is part of life. Hence the 
unexpected cannot guarantee success. But it guarantees the best chance of 
it.  That is why the successes of history, if not won by exceptionally clever 
generalship, have been won by generalship that was astoundingly bold—
or were due to the opponent being blindly foolish. 13  
Three renowned military strategists with strikingly opposing views on the use of 
deception use in warfare, yet all remain master strategists.  Sun Tzu believes winning a 
battle without ever entering the field of battle, via means of deception, is the ultimate 
goal of war.  Sir Liddell Hart proposes indirect action or being bold and surprising the 
enemy during the ensuing battle.  Finally, von Clausewitz implies that only the weak in 
military force and military cunning will ever resort to deception.  Figure 2 depicts the 
three strategists on the continuum of war timeline. 
 




                                                 
12 Niccolo Machiavelli, The Prince (NY: New American Library, 1952), 110- 113. 
13 B. H. Liddell Hart, Thoughts on War (Ann Arbor:  University Microfilm International, 1944), 204. 
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D.  RELEVANCE 
The renewed emphasis on information operations, as evidenced by the JP 3-13 
update, suggests that a shrinking military force will be held responsible for expanding 
operational areas.  Further, more agile and capable enemies enhance deception’s utility 
for U.S. fighting forces. Commanders in the field are pressed for time during operations 
and require a basic understanding of deception’s best practices.  Analyzing the 
mechanisms of deception and synthesizing these into essential tenets could enhance 
deceptions usefulness as a force multiplier and achieve higher economy of force.  To 
achieve U.S. objectives in Iraq and elsewhere, smaller U.S. forces are going to have to 
outwit, not just out gun, the enemy.  
E.  METHODOLOGY 
The first chapter outlines the U.S. military and historical strategists’ views on 
deception.  The second chapter centers upon the broader scholarly literature on deception, 
highlighting seven to eight experts in the field.  A short summary of each scholar’s 
general principles and what they believe is the root of a successful deception is discussed.   
To clearly delineate between scholarly thought and the U.S. Joint Publications’ six 
principles of deception (focus, objective, centralized control, security, timeliness, and 
integration) a summation and comparison of the opposing schools of thought will be 
presented.  These schools of thought are then compared against current US military 
doctrine regarding deception.   
Chapter III is a presentation of four historical case studies of tactical and 
operational deception in battle.  Each case study is a brief description of a particular 
battle, how deception was applied, and how and why it was successful.   Chapter III is 
also an analysis of each of the four case studies to see if any, or all, show evidence of my 
hypothesis that operational advantage is essential to successful deception.  Again, 
operational advantage consists of surprise, information advantage, security, and economy 
of force.    
 
7 
II. PRINCIPLES OF DECEPTION 
Ruses are of great usefulness.  They are detours which often lead more 
surely to the objective than the wide road which goes straight ahead.  
Frederick the Great: Instructions for His Generals.14 
 
Who is better prepared to define deception, in particular military deception: the 
United States military or academics?  Do the academics’ theories and principles correlate 
with the six principles the U.S. military applies to deception?   Academics, such as 
Barton Whaley, Katherine Herbig and Donald Daniel, Michael Handel, and others have 
written volumes on deception, each with competing principles and rules for a successful 
deception operation.   
A summation and comparison of U.S. Military Doctrine, Joint Publication 3-58 
(Joint Doctrine on Military Deception) and Joint Publication 3-13 (Joint Doctrine on 
Information Operations), opposed to select academics’ principles is the quickest way to 
cull the relevant points.  In theory, the critical factors absent from the literature are 
Operations Security (OPSEC), Surprise, Information Advantage (intelligence, 
communications channels, and feedback) and economy of force. 
A. U.S. MILITARY STANDPOINT: JOINT PUBS 3-58 AND 3-13 
JP 3-58 defines military deception as: 
…those actions executed to deliberately mislead adversary military 
decision makers as to friendly military capabilities, intentions, and 
operations, thereby causing the adversary to take specific actions (or 
inactions) that will contribute to the accomplishment of the friendly 
mission.15  
 
                                                 
14 Robert Heinl Jr., Dictionary of Military and Naval Quotations (Annapolis, MD: U.S. Naval 
Institute, 1966), 283. 
15 Joint Publication 3-58: Joint Doctrine for Military Deception. (Washington DC: Government 
Printing Office), I1. 
8 
Joint Pub 3-58 outlines six principles for the conduct of deceptive military 
operations:  focus, objective, centralized control, security, timeliness, and integration. 16  
These include:  1) Focus refers to the target of the deception operation--the target is the 
adversary decision maker who decides the adversary’s courses of action, it is not the 
intelligence system which is a conduit or channel for information flow; 2) Objective is 
your intention, which is to cause the enemy to take (or not to take) a specific action; 3) 
Centralized Control defines the organization of the operation, directed and controlled by 
a single element with decentralized execution; 4) Security refers to the operational 
security, only the people who need to know are told about the operation and the ability to 
protect the plan(s) from the enemy; 5) Timeliness is allowing sufficient time for the 
adversary force to analyze the deceptive information, react as required and for the 
friendly feedback loop to notice the action;  and 6) Integration means incorporating the 
deception plan into the basic operational plan, ensuring both occur simultaneously. 17 
Military deception is an integral subcomponent of Information Operations.  Joint 
Pub 3-13, Joint Doctrine for Information Operations (IO), describes (IO) as “involv(ing) 
actions taken to affect adversary information and information systems while defending 
one’s own information and information systems.”18  Adversary information and 
information systems is a critical target to achieve information advantage in a deception 
campaign.  The Joint Staff recently updated and republished Joint Pub 3-13 which further 
describes, “Offensive IO....the integrated use of assigned and supporting capabilities and 
activities, mutually supported by intelligence, to affect adversary decision makers and 
achieve or promote specific objectives.” 19   The main focus of deception is the adversary 
decision maker so deception is but one component of the burgeoning field of Information 
Operations.  Do the scholars agree with the military definition or do they proscribe to a 
different set of principles? 
 
                                                 
16 Joint Publication 3-58: Joint Doctrine for Military Deception. (Washington DC: Government 
Printing Office), I2 – I3. 
17 Ibid. 
18 Joint Publication 3-13: Joint Doctrine for Information Operations (Washington DC: Government 
Printing Office), vii. 
19 Ibid., viii. 
9 
B. ACADEMIC THEORISTS’ PERSPECTIVES 
1. Donald Daniel and Katherine Herbig 
Donald Daniel and Katherine Herbig’s influential work, Strategic Military 
Deception, brought together leading authors on military deception.  Daniel and Herbig’s 
defined deception as: 
…the deliberate misrepresentation of reality done to gain a competitive 
advantage…the immediate aim is to condition a target’s beliefs; the 
intermediate aim is to influence the target’s actions; and the ultimate aim 
is for the deceiver to benefit from the target’s actions.  Deceptions are 
often credited with success when only the first goal is achieved; but, to 
evaluate the actual impact deception has on the course of events, one 
should properly measure the success vis-à-vis the third goal.20 
Their focus was on strategic not operational or tactical deception, but they 
recognize their conclusions can apply to deceptions at all levels. 21   
 
Figure 3.   Daniel and Herbig’s Simple Formula for Successful Deceptions 
 
 
                                                 
20 Donald Daniel & Katherine Herbig. Strategic Military Deception. (New York: Pergamon, 1982), 3, 
5. 
21 Ibid., 3. 









They laid down a formula for success relying on “the basics” as written down by World 
War II British deception planners: 1) secrecy, organization, and coordination; 2) 
plausibility and confirmation; 3) adaptability; 4) predispositions of the target; and 5) 
factors in the strategic situation.22  
Secrecy refers to keeping the enemy in the dark; this could involve the use of a 
cover story, to hide the truth from the enemy.  The other side of secrecy is applying “need 
to know” security to your own troops; “total security is elusive” so only the minimum 
numbers of personnel who need to know about the operation are allowed access.23  To 
guarantee secrecy the deception must be well organized, referring to “detailed 
preparation”.24  Encapsulating the secrecy and organization is the coordination directed 
from a centralized point.25  But even the most secure organization can’t stop all the leaks, 
but even then the target must believe the deceptive information. 
The deceiver must think like the enemy and not project his/her own assumptions 
and values onto the enemy.  The plausibility of a deception is based on the ability of the 
deceiver to actually carry out what he is proposing.  For example, Daniel and Herbig 
would advise that commander’s deception plans should not propose to invade Sicily in 
late June if the commander has no troops in the area and no means of getting them there 
in time.  This would be an implausible deception.  Adding to the plausibility is the 
confirmation of the plan by a number of credible sources.26  The enemy must believe his 
sources are credible and a good way is to have as many open information channels to the 
enemy as possible.   Either way the deception starts from the kernel of truth at the core.   
The truth has a way of shaping as the situation changes and so must deception 
planners adapt to the changing environment.  Deceptions are adaptive as the situation 
                                                 
22 Donald Daniel & Katherine Herbig. Strategic Military Deception. (New York: Pergamon, 1982), 
16. 
23 Ibid, 16. 
24 Ibid. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Ibid, 18. 
11 
dictates and as new opportunities or feedback is received.27  Adaptability is the ability to 
react to the enemy’s reaction to the deception (hopefully they are reacting as planned).   
How an enemy reacts is based on his predispositions, which are in turn based on 
his beliefs and values.   In psychology, a “motivated bias” or rather the enemy reads into 
a situation what he wants to and chooses to see what he wants.28  Even if it is readily 
apparent that something is wrong if all the supporting evidence and predispositions led to 
a false idea then he is deceived.   
Finally, strategic initiative is given to the aggressor.  Holding the initiative means 
the deception planners will have more time to properly plan and coordinate a deceptive 
operation while the defenders are left to respond as needed.29  But having the initiative 
and knowing the enemy’s predispositions are moot if the enemy doesn’t receive the 
intended message.   
Daniel and Herbig are perhaps the most articulate regarding the transmission of 
the message.  In their model of the different possibilities during the transmission and 
interpretation of the signal they discuss five scenarios. The first is proper receipt and 
interpretation of the signal; second, the signal is garbled or modified in transmission; 
third, there is proper receipt, but the message is misinterpreted; fourth, there is proper 
receipt, but the message is dismissed as useless information; and fifth, the signal is never 
received by the target.30  The deceiver always hopes for the first option: proper receipt 
and interpretation of the signal because it bodes well for a successful operation. 
Daniel and Herbig demarcate two types of deception: ambiguity-increasing (A 
type) and misleading (M type).31  Ambiguity-increasing deception “confuses a target so 
that the target is unsure as to what to believe”; basically to compound his uncertainty by 
providing too many options.32  Plan Bodyguard, a World War II operation supporting the 
                                                 
27 Donald Daniel & Katherine Herbig. Strategic Military Deception. (New York: Pergamon, 1982), 
20. 
28 Ibid, 23. 
29 Ibid, 24. 
30 Ibid, 10. 
31 Ibid, 5.  
32 Ibid. 
12 
Normandy invasion provided multiple invasion threats so Germany wouldn’t know where 
to build up troop strength is an example of ambiguity increasing deception.   
On the contrary, misleading deception seeks to reduce ambiguity by “building up 
the attractiveness of one wrong alternative”, in essence convince the target to give 
attention to one option to the detriment of all others.33  An example is Operation 
Mincemeat, the World War II operation to divert all German attention to Sardinia away 
from the intended amphibious landing zone of Sicily.  (See Table 1) 
 Role of Ambiguity 
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Table 1.   M-type vs. A-type Deceptions (adapted from Daniel and Herbig)34                                                  
33 Donald Daniel & Katherine Herbig. Strategic Military Deception. (New York: Pergamon, 1982), 5. 
34 Ibid., 5-6. 
13 
Many of the theorists use the same basic terminology so the subsequent theorist 
overviews are an outline of their major comments and examination of deception 
principles.   Further, as the summaries here illustrate, many of the theorists' central ideas 
regarding the principles of deception overlap. 
2. Jon Latimer 
Jon Latimer, retired British Battalion Intelligence Officer and author of Deception 
in Warfare, states that deception is “created by manipulating perceptions”.35  The target’s 
perceptions are altered to attain military goals.  Latimer espouses British deception 
doctrine which has four main objectives: 
1) Provide a commander with freedom of action to carry out his mission, 
by deluding the enemy as to his intentions and by diverting the enemy’s 
attention away from the action being taken, in order to achieve the aim; 2) 
Mislead the enemy and persuade him to adopt a course of action that is to 
his disadvantage and can be exploited; 3) Gain surprise; and 4) Save the 
lives of one’s own troops. 36 
To accomplish the four objectives above Latimer categorizes seven general 
principles for deception: 
1. Focus – aimed at the mind of the decision maker (how he receives it, 
processes it, experiences, preconceptions) 
2. Action – make them ACT in a  particular manner, make him DO something 
3. Coordination and central control:  controlled by the operations staff  (J3) 
4. Preparation and Timing – logical planning process, timing is critical, marries 
up with operational plan,  
5. Security – Operations Security (OPSEC), secure Operations Plan (OPLAN) 
and deception plan 
6. Credibility and confirmation – enemy must believe it, need a cover plan 
7. Flexibility – adapt to change, story-lines must change 
3. Michael I. Handel  
Michael I. Handel was a professor of Naval Strategy at the U.S. Naval War 
College and a prolific writer on military deception, surprise, and military intelligence.   
                                                 
35 Jon Latimer. Deception in Warfare (Woodstock, NY: Overlook Press, 2001): 62. 
36 Ibid. 
14 
Handel calls deception, “a rational and necessary type of activity because it acts as a 
force multiplier; that is it magnifies the strength or power of the successful deceiver”. 37  
He goes on to illustrate what deception does: 1) deceive enemy relative to friendly 
intentions; 2) deceive enemy relative to friendly capabilities; 3) inflating friendly 
capabilities; 4) deflating friendly capabilities; and 5) possible self-deception (confusing 
yourself in addition to the enemy).38 
Handel’s principles are centered on the intelligence process how a deception plan 
is molded before inception.   His principles are to 1) determine enemy capabilities and 
intentions; 2) maintain secrecy of plan and ensure it is not compromised; 3) force an 
enemy violation of concentration of forces and space (make the enemy spread his force 
thinly); 4) friendly forces’ economy of force (less manpower to accomplish the mission); 
5) use surprise; 6) think like the enemy.39  Handel asserts three essentials items for an 
organization to accomplish a good deception: secrecy, delegation of authority, and 
patience.40  
4. Charles Fowler and Robert Nesbit 
Charles Fowler and Robert Nesbit’s “Tactical Deception in Air-Land Warfare” in 
the Journal of Electronic Defense brilliantly defines their six “rules” for a successful 
tactical deception.  Fowler and Nesbit emphasize intelligence sensors and the intelligence 
process over the broader principles of deception. 
1. To be effective deception must be one that causes the enemy to believe what 
he expects, e.g., have a core of truth 
2. Timely feedback is an essential element of all major deception operations 
3. Deception must be integrated with operations 
4. Denial of information on the true activities is also essential since it will 
depend, in significant part, on stealth and C3 countermeasures activities 
 
                                                 
37 Michael I. Handel. “Intelligence and Deception.” In Military Deception and Strategic Surprise. 
(London: Frank Cass and Co., Ltd, 1982), 122. 
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5. The realism required for any deception activity is a function of the sensor and 
analysis capabilities available to the opponent and the time available to 
analyze the situation disseminate the data to the appropriate points and take 
appropriate actions.  (See Figure 4 for a graphical representation) 
6. The most effective deception will be imaginative and creative, it cannot be 




Figure 4.   Relationship between analysis time and deception fidelity (from Fowler and 
Nesbit)42 
 
5. Barton Whaley 
Barton Whaley is a pillar in the deception community who has written influential 
documents about deception in World War II and beyond.  Whaley, like Latimer, 
pronounces deception as a “distortion of perceived reality”.43 He goes on to declare the 
“purpose of deception is to profess the false in the face of the real”.44  Dr. Whaley then 
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breaks deception into two halves: dissimulation (hiding the real) and simulation (showing 
the false).45  Whaley’s process of deception is a ten step process composed of: 
1. Know the strategic goal  
2.  What reaction do you want from the target 
3.  What do you want the enemy to perceive 
  4.  What facts are hidden (truth) and what ideas are publicized (falsehood) 
  5.  Analyze pattern of concept to be obscured 
  6.  Analyze pattern of concept to be publicized 
  7.  Designate available means to perpetrate the deception 
8.  Intelligence staff passes plan over to operations staff 
9.  Transmit signal to target channels 
          10. Target must accept the deception46  
6.   Walter Jajko 
In his article, “Deception: Appeal for Acceptance; Discourse on Doctrine, Preface 
to Planning” Walter Jajko declares, “deception targets the adversarial decision maker”. 47 
“The broadest objectives for deception activities are: on one’s side, the masking of 
vulnerabilities, exaggeration of strengths, or protection of capabilities and intentions; and 
on the adversary’s side, the misdirection of effort, increase in uncertainty or confirmation 
of certainty.”48 Deception operations “can be force multipliers, mission enhancers, and 
strategic enablers”.49  Jajko views deception as an iterative process with sequential steps 
for planning, evaluating (is the plan secure), coordinating, deconflicting, integrating, 
approving, executing, analyzing, adjusting, coordinating, executing, evaluating, 
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terminating, evaluating, recording, examining, and studying.50   His focus is on a six step 
planning process in which deception planners have direct access to senior leadership:51 
1. Set forth purposes and formulate objectives 
2. Why use deception to achieve the objective 
3. Assess the target (capabilities, strengths, etc) 
4. Develop a deception strategy 
5. Build detailed schedule for the plan 
6. Exploit any/all opportunities 
7. Plan for termination of the plan52 
7.   Jock Haswell 
 Jock Haswell’s Seven Principles for Deception, from The Tangled Web: The Art 
of Tactical and Strategic Deception, are so highly thought of that the Monash University 
of Australia has included them in a course on Information Conflict.  Haswell, like 
Latimer, closely follows the military principles of deception.   
a. Preparation – well defined aim and specific target 
b. Credibility – fits what the target expects; seems logical to the target 
c. Multi-Channel Support—all info sent across different channels must agree 
d. Centralized Control – to avoid confusion; highest level determined by 
number of units involved 
e. Security – limited to fewest number of people; need to know basis 
f. Flexibility – take advantage of opportunities or discard as needed 
g. Coordination – only provided information as needed53 
8. James Dunnigan and Albert Nofi 
Getting the message to the enemy is important, but what are the means to deliver 
the message?  James Dunnigan and Albert Nofi put forward basic deceptive tactics used 
over the ages:  
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• Concealment – hiding forces using natural cover 
• Camouflage – hiding forces using artificial means 
• False and planted information – giving the enemy bad info 
• Displays – make the enemy see what isn’t there 
• Demonstrations – feinting actions; implies action, but no follow-up 
• Feints – implies action, with follow-up action 
• Ruses—tricks54 
C. CROSS ANALYSIS OF MILITARY AND THEORETICAL STANCES 
An analysis of JP 3-58 and JP 3-13 principles of deception against academic 
theorists proves there is a correlation between the two camps with some major 
discrepancies.  Table 2 provides a graphical analysis. 
The academics often don’t discuss the objective, i.e., the aim of the military 
operation or the desired end states.  Generally, the academic literature refrains from 
identifying the focus of a deception.  Some academics argue for targeting the adversary’s 
leader or senior leadership.  Daniel and Herbig, on the contrary argue for targeting, the 
adversary’s intelligence organization.  Others refrain from the subject. 
The adversary’s intelligence organization is often the entry point for information 
about friendly intent and capabilities.  However, intelligence organizations often do not 
make the decisions for the army/state--the adversary maker and/or leader retain those 
decisions.  Centralized control was mentioned by more than half the academics though it 
is more inferred than stated by Jajko and Daniel and Herbig.  Everyone agrees that 
security is paramount for a successful deception.  Timeliness is another hit and miss 
principle with the academics, some believe building timelines is important and others 
ignore the issue all together.  Only Fowler and Nesbit and Latimer discuss integration 
into the operational plan.   
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Focus Intel org X    X X 
Objective  X   X X X 
Centralized 
Control 
X X    X X 
Security X X X X X X X 
Timeliness  X  X  X  
Integration  X  X    
Table 2.   Comparison of Academics to Military Principles of Deception 
 
D. CRITICAL FACTORS FOR SUCCESSFUL DECEPTION: 
OPERATIONAL ADVANTAGE, INFORMATION ADVANTAGE, AND 
SURPRISE 
How can we synthesize these principles?  What are the common strands found in 
each?  Deception planners must ensure the deceptions contain an element of truth or they 
will not be realistic or plausible.  The deception should be integrated into operations from 
the start so both enemy and friendly forces take it as a fact and not a ruse.  Infiltrating the 
enemy network and convincing all friendly forces not in the know that the deception 
doesn’t exist is part of the hurdle, thus making operational security a critical factor. 
Keeping the “plan” and true desired effect out of the enemy’s grasp is the goal of 
deception.  This is enhanced by intelligence—knowing your enemy, knowing his 
channels of information receipt, and understanding the enemy’s predispositions.  
Furthermore, ensuring the scenario is plausible, to not only the planners, but to the 
enemy’s way of thinking, can guarantee success.  Finally, instituting valid feedback 
channels to gauge the enemy response to deception and flexibility in response to the 
20 
enemy’s rejoinder are also essential.  But what is missing from the theorist's main 
principles? As the Air University Cyberspace and Information Operations Study Center 
webpage states, “OPSEC alone won’t adversely influence enemy capability to perceive 
friendly mission intent or dispositions.  He will either commit more assets to gather 
information or will become more dangerously unpredictable. “55 
Operational advantage, consisting of surprise, information advantage, security, 
and incorporation of feedback mechanisms into the planning phases, is missing from the 
above listing of “required” items for deception. Surprise is used to confuse the enemy, 
deceive them about the force size/components, time of attack, location of attack, and 
intent.  Surprise is enhanced by proper information advantage, which in essence is good 
intelligence and more importantly proper use of the intelligence data, and keeping the 
info as need to know (security).  Ultimately, this can lead to economy of force; applying 
minimal manpower to outwit rather than out gun the enemy.  Reviewing some 
operational level deceptions will further the case for surprise, info advantage, and 
security leading to economy of force. 
 
                                                 55 Battlefield Deception Operations, http://www.au.af.mil/info-ops/influence.htm#deception accessed 
on 29 March 2008. 
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III. CASE STUDIES 
The real target in war is the mind of the enemy commander, not the bodies 
of his troops 
Captain Sir Basil Liddell Hart, Thoughts on War, 1944 
 
Military operations from history provide the basis and supplementary justification 
for surprise, information advantage, and security as essential elements for operational 
advantage and in the long-term victory.  To emphasize the point, the cases studies are 
across a broad range of history, from the Mongol invasion of Europe in 1241 to 
Hezbollah in Lebanon today. 
A. MONGOLS INVADE EUROPE, 1241  
 The Mongolian invasion of Poland and Hungary in 1241 is an excellent model for 
deception.  The Mongols, under Sabutai, expertly utilized surprise (attacking from a 
different location then expected), security (keeping the attack location and overall goal 
hidden) and information advantage (learning the ways and political issues of the enemy) 
allowing economy of force (using minimal numbers and defeating possibly over-
whelming odds). 
The Mongols invaded Europe at Liegnitz, in what is modern day Poland, in April 
1241 with only 20,000 men.  However, this was just the diversion while the main thrust 
moved into Hungary. 56  The Mongols, led by Kaidu (a great-grandson of Genghis Khan) 
had already run though two towns, Lublin and Sandomir, and it was known they were 
advancing further into Europe.57  The bait and switch was Sabutai, General to Genghis 
Khan, leading the real army (70,000 men, mainly light cavalry with bows) onto the prime 
objective.58  Sabutai marched toward Hungary and the Danube, from modern day Russia,  
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while Kaidu drove thru Poland providing the ruse.  Sabutai forward deployed spies/scouts 
to ascertain the political, military, and economic conditions of the areas the Mongol army 
would march through and eventually attack.59 
 Sabutai used this early intelligence to build understanding of the inter-
relationships of the nobles and kingdoms and to ascertain if a side attack to Poland would 
split noble alliances.61  The nobles definitely did not provide a united front and Kaidau 
took advantage and struck Sandomir and other small towns enroute to seek King 
Wenceslas of Bohemia and to draw Duke Henry II of Silesia onto a plain surrounded by 
low hills, the perfect location for an ambush.62 
  The Mongols were a forward fighting force with no set “home base” or quick 
route to their home territories; they fought with the men at hand and aimed for a quick, 
decisive victory. 63  With these limitations at hand, deception and cunning were an 
integral part to Mongolian warfare, along with the fast horses and leadership by the most 
capable man not the richest man.  In the battle with Duke Henry at Wahlstadt, Kaidu 
employed attack, false flight and ambush a common steppe tactic.64  The knights in their 
heavy armor depending on close quarter tactics were no match for the swift ponies and 
light cavalry with bows of the Mongols.  Furthermore, the Mongols used advanced 
communications methods, in particular, pennant/standard signaling, to provide force 
movement and accountability. 65  This “silence” threw the knights off because they could 
not gauge the enemy location like normal from a battle cry.   
 The battle started off like any normal skirmish with the two armies clashing on 
the field, but the Mongols quickly surrounded the slower moving Europeans causing the 
knights to retreat back to their lines.  The knights advanced for two more charges, then 
the Mongols suddenly retreated and the knights continued pursuit.  Then the Mongols 
presented the first surprise of the day, by calling out “Byegaycze! Byegaycze! or Run! 
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Run! In Polish.”66  This call for retreat worked and the knights started departing the 
battlefield.   It was quickly discovered to be a ploy and the knights waded back into 
battle, but again the Mongols started to withdraw.   This tactic, the feigned retreat, was an 
old Mongolian tactical move to draw the enemy away from the infantry and allow the 
light cavalry to rain arrows on the uncoordinated enemy and “guide” them toward a 
preset ambush site.66  In addition, the Mongols truly used the fog of war by “pushing” 
smoke across the battle area to further confuse and decentralize the enemy command and 
control. 67 
 While Kaidu and Duke Henry clashed, Sabutai and his 50,000 men met a force of 
six times greater size commanded by King Bela IV of Pest at the plain of Mohi, in 
present day Hungary.68  Sabutai marched in three columns, two outer to form a shield for 
the third, central column.   The Mongols were at a force disadvantage, but used the layout 
of the land and tactical maneuvering to gain the upper hand.  They backed over a river 
and laid claim to the only bridge in the area and protected it with catapults.  The Mongols 
then faced the Europeans and as the assault continued and retreat was imminent they 
guided the Europeans, started an assault on their left flank, and forced the knights back 
into their base camp. 69   
   The Mongols encircled the camp and left an intentional opening allowing the 
knights to think they could escape and the Mongols would be none the wiser.  In reality, 
this gap was the trail into the awaiting Mongolian ambush. 70  As Military History 
magazine said, “The Hungarian retreat degenerated into a panicky, disorderly rout—just 
as Subotai had calculated it would when he deliberately left them that tantalizing but 
deceptive escape route.”71 
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 Military History magazine summons up the victories as “simply exercised 
discipline, efficiency and order” by the Mongolians.72  But it is more than that, the 
Mongols exploited intelligence of the enemies political, social, economic, and military 
capabilities to the extent that they knew what areas to attack based on the support, or lack 
there of, and the number of forces at the locations.  By understanding the terrain better 
than the people who lived there, the Mongols could create lines for feigned withdrawals, 
designate ambush sites and drive the enemy to the battlefield of choice.  Additionally, by 
managing the information (keeping it secure) the enemy assumed the Mongols were 
attacking in Poland instead of the main objective of Hungary.   The element of surprise 
was definitely on the Mongolian side whether it was tactics (signally with pennants, fast 
ponies or smoke on the battleground), guessing the Mongolian main objective or the 
well-rehearsed ambush tactics.  These deceptive tactics allowed the Mongolians to use 
the minimal number of forces to accomplish a lofty goal and defeat a superior force (in 
numbers).  These same ideas were used almost five hundred years later when the smaller 
United States revolutionary army meets the British forces. 
 The Mongols did not embrace all six principles (focus, integration, timeliness, 
security, objective and centralized control) of Joint Publication 3-58, Joint Doctrine on 
Military Deception.   Sabutai focused on the enemy’s psyche and broke down external 
support from other military/political leaders, but the Mongols did not target a single 
adversary leader, per se.  Centralized control was not affected, since Sabutai broke the 
army into two forces to converge on the common objective of Hungary.  The Mongols 
expertly integrated the deception into the overall plan and operational security was 
applied, in the sense that the Mongolian leadership understood the strategic plan while 
the field troops and local villagers did not understand what was happening.  Finally, the 
deception was enacted along a specific enough timeline to affect discontent among the 
royal parties and to allow the Mongolian army to proceed upon planned attack routes.  In 
short, they actualized four, discarded centralized control and partially realized focus.  
Meanwhile, the Mongols maintained operational advantage of the battlefield through 
surprise attack routes and formations, information advantage of what royals would pledge 
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allegiance to others and security of information from the enemy, allowing economy of 
force meeting all the necessary objectives of this thesis.  
B. U.S. REVOLUTIONARY WAR, 1776-1781 
 Most have heard the story of General George Washington crossing the Delaware 
River.  However, most of do not realize it was the epitome of trickery.  General 
Washington like the Mongols before him sent spies into the enemy camp to collect 
information and sow the seeds of mistrust.  Washington denied information, via counter-
espionage and providing false information, which was unusual for warfare at this time. 73  
He mastered the operational advantage by applying security (providing false data to spies 
and keeping planning to those who needed to know); information advantage (using spies, 
information denial) and surprise that allowed his already economized force to succeed.  
 The Continental Army was facing a rough winter in 1776-77 in New Jersey with 
little food, improper clothing, low supplies, and a dwindling force and men returned to 
their homes.  The British, on the other hand, were well-fed, armed, and more importantly 
only fifty miles away.74  Washington had to figure out how to get the upper hand and do 
it quickly, before the British realized the pathetic state of the Continental Army. 
  The first act of deception was to give the manifestation of a much larger force.  
An age-old tactic is to station a man or two at a campfire and light many fires and over a 
wide area to it seems a larger army.  In Washington’s time of staying at the local inns and 
family homes, he stretched his men across many dwellings so “creating an illusion among 
the civilians that there were Americans soldiers wherever a person looked”.75 
 Washington knew the area was crawling with Tory spies and used this to his 
advantage to feed them false information, rumors and bogus troop counts.  The bogus 
troop numbers even ended up in the hands of General Howe, commander of the British 
forces in the area, and convinced him not to assault the strong Continental Army. 76  
Washington intelligence and disinformation campaign was brilliant because he listened to 
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the feedback mechanisms from the British, but more importantly he fed into their 
receivers at many angles.  The British receiving the data from so many different sources 
assumed that it could only be true.   
 Washington’s stratagem was to trick the British into believing the Continentals 
were to attack Philadelphia and New York.  The Continental forces rounded up boats and 
“prepared” for an amphibious assault and presented the impression to the ever-present 
Tory spies that an all out assault was in the making. 77  Besides the visual deception, 
Washington kept the intelligence deception ready with false message written in his own 
hand and keeping the enemy in mind, realizing he could not cross the invisible barrier of 
passing to much information and maintaining plausibility.   Washington used the ploy, to 
attack New York City, again in 1781.  It was a well-known fact that he wanted to siege 
the city and used this to his advantage to trick the British into moving their forces toward 
the city.78  Instead, he marched his men south giving the appearance of an offensive on 
New York, but changed course in Virginia and went to Yorktown to assist Lafayette and 
the French ultimately ending with General Cornwallis’ defeat and the tide turned to the 
Colonial and the War for Independence was essentially won.79 
 General Washington simply used the British prejudices about the colonists, 
colonial tactics, and assumed troop strengths against the stronger nation.  He skillfully 
feed false data into their “receivers” and trusted agents and maintained very tight security 
over the intelligence he shared with his own staff to keep the ruses credible.  He used his 
understanding of the terrain, the British, his own limitation (men, militia assistance, 
supplies, ammo) to wield operational deceptions and dexterously applied these against 
the English war machine allowing the smaller nation to claim victory (economy of force).  
The Washington’s lessons were not forgotten as they were used eighty years later in the 
War Between the States.  
 General Washington, to a point, applied the six principles of Joint Publication 3-
58.  Washington did not focus on a single leader (General Howe), rather he populated 
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illusions about his force strength and hoping the information would end up in any British 
military leadership hands.   He centrally controlled deception, and in many instances 
centrally executed (memos in his own hand), while decentralized for troop lodging to 
boost the force numbers.  In addition, he definitely integration deception into the main 
strategy and executed it along very specific timelines expertly utilizing the feedback loop 
of information.  Because he controlled the operational security of the information so 
tightly he was able to meet the objective of having the British forces turn or retreat, as he 
desired.  General Washington also met the objectives of the thesis by applying 
operational advantage to the battlefield.  He implemented information advantage via 
deceptive manning numbers and false plans of attack, keeping the information close hold 
at all times and enabling the economy of force by default based on his weaker troop 
strength. 
C. U.S. CIVIL WAR 
Union Major General William S. “Old Rosey” Rosecrans outwitted the Rebels at 
the battle of Tullahoma-Chattanooga in 1863, part of the Chickamauga campaign, by 
misleading on where he would cross the Tennessee River.80 Rosecrans’ force of 65,000 
men was not something that could be hidden from the people as they traversed the land 
and intelligence was always following to the Confederates about the army’s movements.  
His forces were constantly skirmishing with General Braxton Bragg’s army and 
eventually ended up at Chattanooga and Murfreesboro in central Tennessee.81 
Rosecrans spread his army out over eighty miles permitting them time to 
recuperate and replenish supplies for over a month while the Confederate army did the 
same.  During this time, General Rosecrans, who according to Dunnigan and Nofi was a 
“meticulous planner” about how he would engage the enemy and which area was best 
suited to a battle, for example across the Tennessee River.82   He decided upon the classic 
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feint of attacking one area, in this case Chattanooga, while hiding his real objective of 
crossing the river at diverse locations.  Brigadier General William B. Hazen led the feint 
and described it as, 
…As if trying to cross the river at different points for 40 miles above the 
town, and succeeded in so deceiving them as to induce them to use an 
entire army corps to prevent the execution of such purpose…Details were 
made nearly every night to build camp fires indicating larger camps, and 
by throwing boards upon others and hammering on barrels and sawing up 
boards….we made them believe we were preparing to cross with boats.83 
This feint and two more feints, basically delaying tactics, allowed Rosecrans’ army to 
cross the river almost unhindered and ready to attack the Rebels from behind.   
 General Rosecrans had the ultimate in operational advantage permitting the 
precise execution of the ultimate surprise: placing the Rebels in three separate flanking 
movements.  From fires magnifying the number of available forces and their locations to 
securing the actual crossing routes to contrived scuffles to shelling Chattanooga, he 
maintained the upper hand and directed General Bragg’s actions.84  Spies abounded, as 
they do in war, and he fed into the Rebel communications channels the right information 
via voice and deed to throw them off the truth.  Gen Rosecrans’ security measures kept 
the Rebels guessing about the real force numbers and actual river crossing routes so that 
it was almost eighteen days before the Rebels realized the Union Army had crossed and 
was advancing.85  Another brilliant execution of information advantage, security and 
surprise utilizing economy of force, occurred when General Hazen’s brigade was used to 
divert the Confederate forces.  But can these deception tactics be applied in modern 
warfare with satellite imagery, listening devices, instant communication, and smart 
weapons? 
 General Rosecrans applied most of the six principles of Joint Publication 3-58.  
Rosecrans’ objective was to cross the river and to cause the Rebels to attack in patterns 
that would allow successful river crossings for his men.  He did not have to focus on the 
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decision maker as much as the intelligence apparatus to presume he had more men and in 
different locations then reality.  Rosecrans accomplished this deception thru decentralized 
execution down to the lowest private.  He integrated the deception into the plan to attack 
and control Chattanooga and permitted enough time for the Rebel forces to believe the 
Yankee forces outnumbered them.  Finally, he practiced good operational security by 
sending false signals through the Rebel communication/intelligence channels. Rosecrans 
too, met the premise of this thesis by achieving operational advantage of the battlefield 
through surprise, information advantage and security.  He did not necessarily arrive at 
economy of force, however fewer forces were need in the battle and risked death or 
capture. 
D. HEZBOLLAH 
Hezbollah used surprise and strived for an information advantage to execute 
deception.  The need for Hezbollah to use deception was particularly acute because it was 
outnumbered relative to its opponent—the Israeli Defense Force—and must practice 
economy of force.  Hezbollah practiced deception operations against the Israeli army; 
first, they “deployed the perception of its followers as men in search of martyrdom”.86 
Hezbollah became the first organization to widely use suicide bombers; this tactic 
definitely unsettled the Israeli Defense Forces.  Dr. Augustus Norton states that 
martyrdom has “transformed from an exemplary act of suffering and sacrifice into an 
inspiring model for revolution and action”. 87 Hezbollah refers to the Israeli forces as 
“Yazidis” comparing them to the oppressors of Imam Husayn and bringing renewed 
religious fervor to bear against the Israeli occupiers, bringing information advantage into 
the fight.55  Hezbollah used the information advantage in the form of martyrdom and a 
religious cause to keep the Israeli’s guessing as to the next move, furthermore then 
practiced surprise thru cover and concealment. 
Hezbollah practiced psychological operations by winning the numbers game of 
“our side has fewer dead than yours,” affecting the will of the Israeli people to continue 
the fight in Lebanon.  In the late 1980s the ratio of Hezbollah to Israeli Defense Forces 
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(IDF)/Southern Lebanese Army (SLA) losses was 5:1, which dropped to 2:1 by 1995.56  
Hezbollah had turned toward a more organized guerilla warfare force using better tactics, 
planning, and intelligence.  Sheikh Nabil Qaouk, Hezbollah’s chief of military 
operations, provides ample illustrations of deceptive tactics: Soviet T55 tanks hidden in 
caves (concealment) and firing at Israeli positions; remote-controlled anti-tank rockets, 
guided in flight; jamming of Israeli radar and closed-circuit television monitors 
(electronic warfare/displays/false info).57   Qaouk also spoke to “low-tech methods of 
guerilla warfare” such as: artificial boulders (camouflage) to hide roadside bombs, 
explosives hidden in tree branches at shoulder/head level (concealment), herds of sheep 
used to throw off Israeli heat-seeking equipment while the Hezbollah forces changed 
locations (surprise).58  As a final insult, the Hezbollah fighters could blend back into the 
population after an operation and people would hide them.59  Hezbollah exploited 
improvised explosive devices (IEDs) to stop the mobility of the IDF/SLA forces.60  This 
in turn forced the Israelis to stay in their bunkers and not venture out on the roads for fear 
for being blown up and gave the operational advantage to the Lebanese to control the 
area.   
Further pushing the Israeli people toward withdrawal were the broadcasts from al-
Manar (the Beacon), Hezbollah’s main satellite station, which reached Israel and 
provided a nightly dose of images (of dead IDF soldiers).61  Al-Manar provided 
demoralization of the Israelis on a nightly basis, but also a morale boost to the Lebanese 
and Arabs of the region each time Israel lost another battle.   The station also played reels 
of suicide bombers, Hezbollah military actions (usually victories), and anything to 
unnerve the Israeli public.  This information warfare/advantage tactic was done to press 
home to the Israelis how many of their own were dying every day, how great militarily 
the Lebanese were (especially with the IDF hunkered down in bunkers), and to push the 
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Israelis to pressure their own government to pull out of Lebanon. Hezbollah and the 
Lebanese people in general, did not want to invade Israel or seize back Jerusalem; they 
just wanted their land back.   
Hezbollah used the massacre at Qana, part of Operation Grapes of Wrath, to their 
advantage also.  They had video and photos of the incident and showed the world that 
Israeli was not attacking to protect itself, but rather attacking innocent citizens and 
thereby committing terrorism and genocide, the very thing it accused Hezbollah of 
committing. After the Qana massacre, or any other major IDF assault, Hezbollah fighters 
would gather in mass with shovels to greet returning refugees to help rebuild their homes.  
They showed the people of Lebanon, and by default the people of Israeli, that Hezbollah 
was there to rebuild the region.62  Hezbollah also played up the David versus Goliath 
image, as the little guerilla group fighting the better-equipped and large force of the 
IDF.63  This gave Hezbollah a popular image in the predominately Arab region as the 
fighter for the people who will stand up to the evil giant of Israel.  Hezbollah was not 
afraid to show their losses and defeats and broadcast them nightly on al-Manar television, 
giving voice to “the righteous fury backed up by unassailable national rights”.64 
Hezbollah forces that carried video cameras on most operations documented these 
losses.  In 1997, Hezbollah discovered an Israeli plan to infiltrate a commando squad into 
Lebanon to either kidnap or kill a Hezbollah political leader.65  They video-taped the 
elimination of the entire squad as they moved right into the Hezbollah ambush.66  This 
incident demoralized the Israeli public and frustrated the Israeli media who were not 
allowed access to the mission.  Furthermore, it fed into Hezbollah’s claim that the Israelis 
were terrorists since they were sending assassination squads into another country.  This 
act alone united the Lebanese across religious differences.  
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Hezbollah had to appeal to the Christian as well as the Muslim Lebanese 
population and they accomplished this through astute political acumen.  Sayyed 
Fadlallah, the Party of God’s spiritual leader, has the gift of speech and elucidates 
Hezbollah’s vision that “makes sense not only to secular Muslims but to Christians as 
well”.67   Fadlallah couched Hezbollah’s acts, whether suicide bombings or military 
attacks, in Arab nationalist prose to appeal to all Lebanese regardless of religious 
affiliation.68  Judith Harik calls this ideological ambiguity and declares it an important 
strategy to broaden support.69  Hezbollah has perfectly presented their argument in info 
warfare terms, presenting a religious jihad as a secular nationalist movement.   
Hezbollah expertly implements its information advantage.  They have made the 
media a tool of the intelligence/information campaign and use the airwaves to hit all the 
“channels” of the enemy to include their populace.   Media propagation enables 
Hezbollah to expand a normal information advantage to plant false ideas on a larger scale 
and to manipulate video and voice to guarantee more support.  This in turn enables their 
economy of force by gaining “forces” in the populace and neighboring countries and 
possibly expanding the “spy” network further enabling the info advantage.  Finally, 
security ties into the equation because it is a population, religiously centered, fighting 
against the enemy for a way of life and no secrets will be leaked to the enemy in that 
situation.   
Hezbollah practiced some of six principles of Joint Publication 3-58 with great 
effect.  The focus was always the civilian and military leaders with the goal to force their 
hand to leave the disputed lands and Hezbollah applied suicide bombs and psychological 
operations to have the Israeli people persuade their leaders to depart.   The objective was 
simple: Israeli Defense Force and Israeli people leave Lebanese land.  Hezbollah 
centrally controlled the Lebanese   “forces” and allowed them to execute raids and attacks 
at the lower levels with the thought that any attack would assist the “cause”.  Operational 
security is easier when the two people have a quarrel for centuries and do not interact.  
                                                 
67 Judith Harik. Hezbollah: The Changing Face of Terrorism. (London: I.B. Tauris, 2004), 70. 
68 Ibid., 70. 
69 Ibid., 71. 
33 
Timeliness is not a factor since it is an ongoing campaign, however technology has 
allowed multiple information channels (radio, television, satellite) to be used as 
propaganda at any given time.  Finally, deception is integrated into military and political 
plans.  Hezbollah met the premise of this thesis by achieving operational advantage of the 
battlefield through surprise attacks, suicide bombings and information advantage via 
technological means.   Security is applied in the strictest sense, neighbors do not inform 
on each other for fear of death or reprisal.   Based on the overwhelming odds, troops and 
weapons, Hezbollah started out with economy of force and used it to their advantage. 
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IV. CONCLUSIONS 
I have always believed in doing everything possible in war to mystify and 
mislead one’s opponent70   
A.P. Wavell 
 
 As we said at the outset, Joint Publication 3-58 outlines six principles for the 
conduct of deceptive military operations:  focus, objective, centralized control, security, 
timeliness, and integration. 1) Focus refers to the target of the deception operation--the 
target is the adversary decision maker who decides the adversary’s courses of action, it is 
not the intelligence system which is a conduit or channel for information flow; 2) 
Objective is your intention, which is to cause the enemy to take (or not to take) a specific 
action; 3) Centralized Control defines the organization of the operation, directed and 
controlled by a single element with decentralized execution; 4) Security refers to the 
operational security, only the people who need to know are told about the operation and 
the ability to protect the plan(s) from the enemy; 5) Timeliness is allowing sufficient time 
for the adversary force to analyze the deceptive information, react as required and for the 
friendly feedback loop to notice the action;  and 6) Integration means incorporating the 
deception plan into the basic operational plan, ensuring both occur simultaneously.  
The case studies have shown that not all six principles are required for a 
successful deception operation.  In fact, focus appears to be the least required when on 
the battlefield, the will of the people and possible coalitions between nations are just as 
effective targets.  Centralized control was also not as important especially if it can be 
centrally instead of decentrally executed, like the Mongols and General Washington.  
Operational security, integration, timeliness and objective were important factors in all 
the case studies.   Objective is a given in any situation though, without a reason then there 
is no cause for the operation.  While the six joint principles are imperative to warfare, 
true operational advantage is obtained through surprise, information advantage and 
security, which can lead to economy of force.  
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Surprise is used to confuse the enemy, deceive them about the force 
size/components, time of attack, location of attack, and intent.  Surprise is enhanced by 
proper information advantage, which in essence is good intelligence and more 
importantly proper use of the intelligence data, and keeping the info as need to know 
(security).  Ultimately, this can lead to economy of force; applying minimal manpower to 
outwit rather than out gun the enemy.   Throughout history from the Mongols in 1241 to 
Hezbollah today having the better intelligence, applying it plausibility and through the 
right channels, all the while maintaining your secrets and real objectives is the key to 
victory.   
Richard Betts’ article, “Surprise Despite Warning: Why Sudden Attacks 
Succeed”, saying detecting a threat is not enough, it must be properly channeled, 
understood and properly relayed.71   Betts further believes deception is cheap, requiring 
little investment of men or material.72  But I disagree, intelligence and formulating the 
deception is not a cheap exercise, nations must make better use of their intelligence 
services and expand information operations through media channels to receive real 
benefits. 
If information advantage is properly formulated, carried out, and secured, it is a 
force magnifier and essential to warfare.  Information advantage is even more important 
in modern warfare where instantaneous coverage can quickly give away positions and 
My Space pages are an operations security nightmare.  It is becoming more difficult to 
maintain positive security of information and intelligence as computers are the source and 
holder of knowledge and hackers abound, but now more than ever need to know is 
imperative.  Smart weapons proliferate the notion of economy of force and as military 
forces downsize worldwide there use will expand as countries purchase them.   
Information advantage and surprise is for naught if operational security is not 
maintained.  Controlling who knows the plan and where the information is stored are 
essential to minimizing a leak.  In today’s world of satellite imagery, the World Wide 
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Web, telephones, etc information is moving at lightening speed and unless properly 
protected can be pieced together by the enemy to show the bigger picture.   
History has proven that understanding your enemy, political environment, terrain, 
media/intelligence inputs and outputs along with proper implementation of info 
advantage and security are force multipliers and causes of victory.  Proper utilization of 
deception at the tactical and operational level is essential, especially in this era of 
insurgency and “three block” warfare. In short, to achieve U.S. objectives in Iraq and 
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APPENDIX – JOPES IO (MILITARY DECEPTION) GUIDANCE73 
The guidance in this annex relates to the development of Tab A (Military Deception) 
of Appendix 3 (Information Operations) to Annex C (Operations) of the OPLAN/ 
CONPLAN/OPORD/campaign plan/functional plan format found in CJCSM 
3122.03, “Joint Operation Planning and Execution System, Volume II, Planning 
Formats and Guidance.” 
 
1. Situation 
a. General. What is the general overall situation concerning military deception? 
b. Enemy 
• General Capabilities. What are the enemy military capabilities relating directly 
to the planned deception? 
• Deception Targets. What are the deception targets? 
• Target Biases and Predispositions. What are the target biases and 
predispositions? 
• Probable Enemy COA. What is the probable enemy COA? (Refer to Annex B 
(Intelligence) of the basic plan.) 
c. Friendly 
• What is the friendly forces situation? 
• What, if any, are the critical limitations? 
• What is the concept of friendly operations? 
d. Assumptions 
• What are the assumptions concerning friendly, enemy, or third-party 
capabilities, limitations, or COAs? 
• What conditions does the commander believe will exist when the plan becomes 
an order. 
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2. Mission 
a. Operational Mission. See paragraph 2 of the basic plan or order. 
b. Deception Mission 
• Deception Goal. What is the desired effect or end state the commander wishes 
to achieve? 
• Deception Objective(s). What is the desired action or inaction by the adversary 
at the critical time and location? 
• Desired Enemy Perceptions. What must the deception target believe for him/her 
to make the decision that will achieve the deception objective? 
• Deception Story. What scenario will cause the deception target to adopt the 
desired perception? Consider one of the COAs discarded during plan preparation. 
3. Execution 
a. Concept of the Operation 
• General. What is the framework for the operation? Include a brief description of 
the phases of the deception operation. 
• Other IO Capabilities 
•• What other capabilities will be used to support the deception operation? 
•• What are the other plans and operations pertinent to the deception? 
•• What coordination and deconfliction is required? 
• Feedback and Monitoring 
•• What type of feedback is expected, if any, and how will it be collected? 
•• What impact will the absence of feedback have on the plan? 
• Means. By what means will the deception be implemented? 
• Tasks. What are the execution and feedback taskings to organizations 
participating in the execution and monitoring of the deception? 
41 
• Risks 
•• Deception is successful. What is the likely adversary response? What will be 
the impact on friendly forces from adversary intelligence sharing? 
•• Deception fails. What is the impact if the deception target ignores the deception 
or fails in some way to take the actions intended? 
•• Deception is compromised to multinational partners or adversaries. What is the 
impact of such compromise on friendly forces and attainment of friendly objectives? 
b. Coordinating Instructions 
• What are the tasks or instructions listed in the preceding subparagraphs 
pertaining to two or more units? 
• What is the tentative D-day and H-hour, if applicable, and any other information 
required to ensure coordinated action between two or more elements of the command? 
4. Administration and Logistics 
a. Administration 
• General. What are the general procedures to be employed during planning, 
coordination, and implementation of deception activities? 
• Specific. What, if any, are the special administrative measures required for the 
execution of the deception operation? 
b. Logistics. What are the logistics requirements for the execution of the 
deception operation (transportation of special material, provision of printing equipment 
and materials)? 
c. Costs. What are the applicable costs associated with the deception operation? 
 NOTE: Do not include those administrative, logistics, and medical actions or 
ploys that are an actual part of the deception operation. 
5. Command, Control, and Communications 
a. Command Relationships 
• Approval. What is the approval authority for execution and termination? 
42 
• Authority. Who are the designated supported and supporting commanders and 
supporting agencies? 
Oversight. What are the oversight responsibilities, particularly for executions by 
non-organic units or organizations outside the chain of command? 
• Coordination 
•• What are the in-theater coordination responsibilities and requirements related to 
deception executions and execution feedback? 
•• What are the out-of-theater coordination responsibilities and requirements 
related to deception executions and execution feedback? 
b. Communications 
• What are the communications means and procedures to be used by control 
personnel and participants in the deception operation? 
• What are the communications reporting requirements to be used by control 
personnel and participants in the deception operation? 
6. Security 
a. General. What are the general security procedures to be employed during 
planning, coordination, and implementation of deception activities? 
b. Specific 
• What are the access restrictions and handling instructions to the deception 
appendix or plan? 
• Who has authority to grant access to the deception appendix or plan? 
• How will cover stories, codewords, and nicknames be used? 
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